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Confession of Error by the Solicitor General
It is the responsibility of the Solicitor General to conduct and
supervise "all aspects of Government litigation in the Supreme
Court .... "' Occasionally, in representing the United States as the
respondent, the Solicitor General will concede that error was com-
mitted in the lower court2 and will join with the petitioner in request-
ig certiorari 3-a practice commonly known as the confession of er-
ror. In addition to acknowledging error in such cases, the Solicitor
General often recommends an appropriate disposition (usually sum-
mary reversal4 with remand) to the Court.5
The Court considers whether corrective disposition is warranted
only after it has exercised its certiorari jurisdiction pursuant to Su-
preme Court Rule 19.0 Rule 19 is applied in all cases, including
1. 1974 ArT. GEN. ANN. REP. 26. The statutory duties of the Solicitor General
are set out in 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1970): "Except when the Attorney General in a
particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and Solicitor General shall
conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court and suits in the Court of
Claims in which the United States is interested." See Fahy, The Office of the
Solicitor General, 28 A.B.A.J. 20 (1942); Werdegar, The Solicitor General and
Administrative Due Process: A Quarter-Century of Advocacy, 36 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 481 (1968).
2. It is not unreasonable for the Government to reverse its position on petition to
the Court since the Solicitor General does not generally participate in the litigation of
the case below, and it is unlikely that the case has come to his attention before the
petition arises. See Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work of the
Solicitor General's Office, 41 A.B.A.J. 229, 230 (1955); Stern, The Solicitor
General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46 A.B.A.J. 154, 157-58
(1960); Stern, Inconsistency in Government Litigation, 64 HARv. L. REv. 759, 761-62
(1951).
3. See Sobeloff, The Law Business of the United States, 34 ORE. L. REv. 145, 149
(1955). Confession of error normally occurs in response to a petition for writ of
certiorari from a criminal conviction below. Note, Government Litigation in the
Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1468 (1969).
For examples of such confessions, see Hayles v. United States, 419 U.S. 892 (1974);
Howard v. United States, 356 U.S. 25 (1958); Simpson v. United States, 355 U.S. 7
(1957). The Solicitor General could confess error in cases that would normally be
considered by the Court under its appellate jurisdiction, by joining in the jurisdictional
statement of the appellant. However, this writer has found no such cases, and
therefore this Note considers confessions of error only in the context .of the Court's
certiorari jurisdiction.
4. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975) (reverse and remand
with leave given to the prosecution to dismiss charges); Hayles v. United States, 419
U.S. 892 (1974) (reverse and remand with leave given to the prosecution to dismiss
charges). On occasion, the Solicitor General has requested reversal without remand.
See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 355 U.S. 7 (1957) (per curiam reversal).
5. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Young v. United States,
315 U.S. 257 (1942). The Solicitor General has been known not to give any
indication of what disposition he desires. See Note, supra note 3, at 1468.
6. "A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons
therefor." U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 19(1). Under rule 19, between 85 and 95 per cent of
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those where error has been confessed, and requires that there be
"special and important reasons" for the Court to grant a petition for
certiorari.7 Reasons deemed "special and important" include the
need to resolve a conflict among the circuits, the need to settle
important federal questions in accordance with prior Supreme Court
decisions and the need to have new federal issues decided by federal,
not state, courts.8 However, rule 19 does not mandate consideration
of whether reversible error was committed in the lower court as a
factor in the decision to grant certiorari. Thus, under its present
application of rule 19, the Supreme Court may refuse to consider a
case despite the likelihood that, if the case were considered on its
merits, reversible error would be found." In deciding whether cer-
tiorari should be granted, the Court has not recognized that confes-
sion of error cases may be amenable to the application of a standard
less rigorous than that of rule 19, even though the probability of
reversible error is obviously greater than in other cases.
Moreover, once certiorari has been granted in a case involving
confession of error (presumably for other "special and important"
reasons), the Court examines the record without recourse to the
Solicitor General's particular representations to ascertain if reversible
error was, in fact, committed.' 0 As the Court stated in Young v.
United States:"'
The public trust reposed in the law enforcement officers of the Gov-
ernment requires that they be quick to confess error when, in their
opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining
silent. But such a confession does not relieve this Court of the
performance of the judicial function. The considered judgment of
the law enforcement officers that reversible error has been commit-
ted is entitled to great weight but our judicial obligations compel us
to examine independently the errors confessed.1
2
all petitions for certiorari are denied. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPRE E COURT
PRACnTCE § 4.2, at 149 (4th ed. 1969).
7. U.S. SuP. CT. R. 19(1).
8. U.S. SuP. Cr. R. (19)(1)(b).
9. Such refusals may be inferred from repeated statements by the Court that
denial of certiorari in no way reflects an opinion of .the Court on the merits. See,
e.g., Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
the denial of cert.); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the denial of cert.). See Vinson, Work of the
Federal Courts, 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949) (presented as an address to the A.B.A. by
Chief Justice Vinson on Sept. 7, 1949: "The Supreme Court is not, and never has
been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions"); R.
STERN & E. GRESSmAN, supra note 6, § 4.2, at 149-54. But see Gibbs, Certiorari: Its
Diagnosis and Cure, 6 HAsT. L.J. 131, 159-61 (1955).
10. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 (1942); Howard v. United States,
356 U.S. 25 (1958) (per curiam).
11. 315 U.S. 257 (1942). In Young, the petitioner had been convicted for
violation of a federal narcotics statute. The Solicitor General confessed error,
claiming that the District Court had misinterpreted the scope of the statute.
12. 315 U.S. at 258-59. Cases after Young indicate its continuing vitality. See,
1068 [Vol. 74:1067
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Thus, cases in which error is confessed are treated the same as all
other cases under rule 19, and, moreover, are not freed from the
requirement of independent Supreme Court scrutiny on the merits
where certiorari is granted.
It is the position of this Note that the Court should formulate a
new policy to govern its review of confessed errors. Specifically, this
Note proposes that in deciding whether to grant certiorari and
whether to defer to the representations of the Solicitor General, the
Supreme Court should distinguish between errors that are normally
subject to judicial scrutiny (reviewable errors)13 and errors of prose-
cutorial discretion that belong to a category of executive conduct not
usually reviewed by the courts.14 When reviewable errors are con-
fessed, the Court should apply a standard more liberal than that of
rule 19 in deciding whether certiorari should be granted. However,
once the Court asserts jurisdiction, it should determine indepen-
dently whether reversal is appropriate. In the context of errors of
prosecutorial discretion, on the other hand, these issues must
be treated differently, since it is generally agreed that the courts
should not scrutinize the application of prosecutorial policies, 5
thus making the independent review standard inappropriate. One
way of avoiding the problem of reviewing such policies is al-
ways to deny certiorari to confessed prosecutorial errors. How-
ever, this Note maintains that the Court instead should always
grant certiorari in such cases and, consistent with the traditional rule
of avoiding scrutiny of prosecutorial policies, should defer to the
Solicitor General's determination of the appropriate disposition in all
but a few extraordinary cases.' 6
The Solicitor General might confess to a wide range of errors
properly subject to review by the judiciary, 7 -the most common
example being an error of law committed by a lower court. The
error may be in the interpretation of a statute' 8 or a prior holding of
e.g., DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 451 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gibson v.
United States, 329 U.S. 338, 344 n.9 (1946). Cf. United States ex rel. Marino v.
Hoton, 227 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1956) (confession of error by state attorney general).
13. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 (1942) (involving the misinterpre-
tation of a federal statute).
14. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 533 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Young as controlling in a case involving an error by the U.S. Attorney in
prosecuting the defendant contrary to prosecutorial policy).
15. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (1967).
16. Certainly a prosecutorial guideline that discriminated against racial minorities
would require scrutiny on constitutional grounds.
17. Confession of error may also be proper in cases in which a change in
circumstances warrants reconsideration of the case although there was technically no
error below. See, e.g., Dyson v. Maryland, 383 U.S. 106 (1966) (confession of error
by a state attorney general).
18. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 (1942) (application of a
federal anti-narcotics statute to practicing physician). A sharp distinction exists
April 19761 1069
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the Supreme Court,19 or in the application of common-law princi-
ples.20  Another reviewable error committed by a lower court is the
failure of a judge to disqualify himself from a case in violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.2 Such a case would normally be review-
able by the Supreme Court pursuant to its supervisory capacity over
the federal judiciary.22 A final example of an error normally subject
to judicial review is the infringement of a defendant's constitutional
rights by a law enforcement official, such as subjection of a defendant
to illegal electronic surveillance following his indictment. 8
The currently prevailing independent review standard of Young
reflects the general rule that the Court will not be bound by the
concurrence of the parties before it on a question of law.24  There
appears to be no persuasive reason for distinguishing confessions of
reviewable error from other cases in which the Court has granted
certiorari. In contrast, there is good reason to treat cases involving
confessions of reviewable error differently than other petitions for
certiorari. 5
Rule 19 was promulgated to provide the Court with discretion
over its caseload in order to enable it to meet its primary responsibil-
ity of deciding cases "whose resolution will have immediate impor-
tance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved. ' 20 It was
between the Solicitor General's admission that a statute was incorrectly interpreted
below and his admission that a statute is unconstitutional. See note 29 infra.
19. See, e.g., Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808 (1952) (interpretation of
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924), in ruling a search and seizure not
unreasonable).
20. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (standard used to
determine the competency of defendant to stand trial).
21. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(b) (1972). See, e.g., Gay
v. United States, 411 U.S. 974 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 452-53 (1957); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1942); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341-42 (1939).
23. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967) (Solicitor General
informed the Court of conversations taped after indictment); Black v. United States,
385 U.S. 26 (1966) (Solicitor General informed the Court of eavesdropping on
petitioner's privileged communications with his attorney). Apparently, Solicitor
General Marshall, concerned with possible illegalities in the government's use of
surveillance, established a policy of total disclosure to the Court of any eavesdropping
involved in a case. As a result, reversal was sometimes not even recommended to the
Court. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 6, § 5.12, at 225; Note, supra
note 3, at 1470-71. See also Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (error
committed in selecting jury confessed by the Solicitor General apparently because of
the infringement on defendant's constitutional rights).
24. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917).
25. In implementing the policy developed in this Note, the Court should not
distinguish among types of reviewable errors.
26. Vinson, supra note 9, at vi. Writ of certiorari jurisdiction was first estab-
lished by the Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. It is now found at
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970). For a detailed legislative history, see F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 255-94 (1927). The discretion
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necessary to allow the Court -the opportunity to refuse to adjudicate
many of the cases presented to it because of the overwhelming bur-
den that accepting briefs, hearing oral arguments, and drafting full
opinions on the merits in every case would present.17 There would
be little problem if the Court could, on the basis of the petition for
certiorari alone, predict whether or not the lower court's decision was
"clearly erroneous" and thereby appropriate for the nonburdensome
procedure of summary disposition 28 following a granting of certiorari.
However, in the majority of cases, the Court cannot determine the
burden that individual cases or classes of cases will impose until after
certiorari is already granted and the individual case is examined on its
merits. Rule 19 thus provides a necessary screening device that
allows the Court discretion without scrutiny of the merits.
In cases involving confessions of reviewable error, however, the
Court can be confident that, if the Solicitor General properly exercises
his authority, an egregious error has in fact been committed and that
summary disposition is therefore appropriate.29 In such cases, the
inherent in certiorari jurisdiction was given form by the promulgation of U.S. Sup.
Cr. R. 19. See note 6 supra.
27. See Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What
the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 335 (1975). "It is cases on the merits,
say members of the Court, which take up most of their time. For various reasons,
the consideration of applications for review-petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional
statements on appeals-is not a very time-consuming task." Id. at 339-40.
28. See R. STmRN & E. GREss AN, supra note 6, § 5.12, at 220; Gibbs, supra
note 9, at 159. See generally Note, The Supreme Court's Per Curiam Practice: A
Critique, 69 HARv. L REv. 707, 721-22 (1956).
29. See note 28 supra. No publicized policy exists as to when the Solicitor General
may confess error. However, the Solicitor General should clearly not confess error
unless firmly convinced that a serious mistake occurred in the lower court. Two con-
siderations support such a policy. First, the Solicitor General's responsibility to act as
an advocate for the government ordinarily entails defending successful lower court
decisions before the Supreme Court. See generally Fahy, supra note 1; Werdegar,
supra note 1. Thus, the Solicitor General should not lightly suggest reversal of
successful government prosecutions. Second, some commentators have expressed
concern that the Court will be deprived of its full powers of review if the Solicitor
General becomes a "tenth Justice." See Note, supra note 3, at 1473-74. To avoid
such criticism, and to fulfill his responsibility, the Solicitor General should reserve
confession of error for cases in which the error is obvious. See also Sobeloff, supra
note 2, at 229, 230.
In cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, the Solicitor General should
exercise greater caution before he confesses error than in cases that involve clear
error in lower court proceedings. At least two considerations support this policy.
First, if the Court declares an Act of Congress unconstitutional, 'the impact will be far
broader than if it merely finds a clear error in prior proceedings. Second, some
writers suggest that the Court should be reluctant to strike down statutes duly enacted
by the elected representatives of the people. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 16 (1962).
In practice, the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute has never been the basis for
a confession of error. However, the Solicitor General should not adopt a policy
prohibiting all such confessions. On occasion, the Court might benefit from the
opinion of the executive branch on the constitutionality of a statute. See HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 82 (2d ed. 1973)
1072 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1067
"special reasons" standard of rule 19, predicated upon avoiding the
anticipated burden of plenary adjudication, seems inapposite. Since
the process of summary disposition imposes no significant burden on
the Court beyond the inescapable one that certiorari consideration
always entails, the Court does not benefit significantly by denying
certiorari in confession of error cases. At the same time, however,
the Government's adversaries in such cases might suffer irreparable
injury if the Court denies certiorari and thus fails to rectify con-
fessed errors.
Only in rare cases in which reviewable error is confessed is the
Court likely to determine, after its independent examination of the
record,30 that no clear error has been committed.3' Although such a
case could arguably impose an unnecessary burden on the Court that
might have been avoided through the application of rule 19, the
mere potentiality of such an occasional burden should not deter the
Court from granting certiorari and rectifying the confessed error in
the vast majority of cases in which summary disposition will be found
appropriate. Rather the Court can and should accommodate the
countervailing interests of avoiding caseload burden and rectifying
lower court errors by departing from its usual certiorari procedure
and examining the merits of the confessed reviewable error as part of
[hereinafter FEDERAL CouRTs]; McClesky, Judicial Review it a Democracy: A
Dissenting Opinion, 3 Hous. L. Rnv. 354, 360-61 (1966).
At times the Court may wish to issue a complete opinion based on oral arguments
even though there is no doubt that error was committed below. See, e.g., Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (Court ignored the Solicitor General's confession
of error and overruled Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957)). Presuma-
bly this would be done because of the significance of the issue involved, and certiorari
would be appropriate under rule 19 in any event. See note 6 supra. When the
Court proceeds to set a case for oral arguments despite a confession of error, it must
take steps to preserve the adversary stature of the parties. In some cases, officials
within the Justice Department other than the Solicitor General may, in good faith, be
able to argue the position opposing that of the petitioner. When this is not possible,
the Court should always appoint an amicus curiae.
30. See text at notes 10-11 supra.
31. For example, the Court's examination might reveal that the Solicitor General
was mistaken about the obviousness of the error or that he confessed error for reasons
other than a belief that reversible error was clearly committed. See Scott v. United
States, 374 U.S. 502 (1963) (confession of error to avoid confronting the Court with
a constitutional issue); Note, supra note 3, at 1469.
Concern over the possibility of manipulative use of confession of error has been
expressed by some members of the Court. See, e.g., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S.
529, 532 (1960) (Warren, CJ., concurring); Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808,
809 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Yet the Court has also expressed a willingness
to use an alternative ground prepared by the Solicitor General to dispose of a case.
See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960) (Warren, C.J., concurring)
(Court complied with the Solicitor General's request in order to abide by the "settled
rule [of not anticipating] 'a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity
of deciding it' "). The altered certiorari standard that this Note proposes for cases in
which reviewable error is confessed should not increase the Court's susceptibility to
manipulation since the Court's responsibility to review the record independently re-
mains the same.
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the process of granting or denying certiorari. 2 Such a preliminary
examination would permit the Court to ascertain whether the Solici-
tor General's characterization of the error is accurate. Only in the
unusual case in which the Court's examination reveals that the con-
fessed error is not egregious should it make its decision to grant
certiorari in accordance with the standards or rule 19.11 In all other
confession of reviewable error cases, the Court should grant certio-
rari 4 and either summarily reverse or comply with the disposition
32. For a discussion of the Court's present practice, see text at notes 6-9 supra.
The Court's burden would not be significantly increased if it were also to consider
whether reversible error was clearly committed during its examination of the record
to see if special reasons exist to grant certiorari. Cf. Griswold, supra note 27, at 339-
40. According to some commentators, the Court makes this inquiry to a limited
extent in all cases. See Gibbs, supra note 9, at 159-61.
33. See note 6 supra. If the decision below was not clearly erroneous, more than
summary disposition will be required. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 6, §
5.12, at 220. Therefore, the decision whether to grant certiorari should be based
upon the caseload considerations underlying rule 19 and not upon the Solicitor
General's belief that certiorari is appropriate.
Certiorari may be appropriate even though the Court does not believe that error
was committed below. The case in which both the Solicitor General and the
petitioner mistakenly believe error was committed will likely present "special and
important reasons" for review as required by rule 19. See note 6 supra. For a
discussion of the preservation of the adversary nature of such a proceeding, see note
29 supra.
34. Some commentators suggest that irrespective of caseload concerns and the
restrictions of rule 19, the Court should deny certiorari when the case at bar presents
problems of ripeness or standing, or involves a political question. See, e.g., A.
BICKEL, supra note 29, at 133-43 (1962) (account of Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961)). But see Gunther, The Subtle Vices
of the Passive Virtues-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review,
64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 13-16 (1964). Insofar as these problems may arise when the
Solicitor General confesses error, the policy of automatically granting certiorari in
response to such confessions must be limited. Therefore, the question arises whether
such problems are relevant in the confession of error context.
The ripeness doctrine states that "[jiudicial machinery should be conserved for
problems which are real and present or imminent, not squandered on problems which
are abstract or hypothetical or remote." 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 21.01, at 116 (1958). See, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947) (hypothetical threat of harm held nonjusticiable). Challenges to criminal
convictions do not present the Court with abstract issues, so problems of ripeness are
not present when the Solicitor General confesses error.
Questions of standing will also not arise when the petitioner has been convicted of
a crime. Standing requires that the litigant have a "sufficient personal interest" in
the outcome of the adjudication to insure an adequate presentation of the issues
involved. See FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 29, at 156. Undoubtedly, the convicted
criminal defendant has such an interest.
A criminal defendant's petition for certiorari could, however, raise a political
question that the Court should not adjudicate. The precise meaning of "political
question" is unclear. Traditionally, political questions are those that involve matters
delegated exclusively to the Congress or the executive branch by the Constitution. See
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L. REV. 1, 9
(1963). For a broader meaning of political question, see Finkelstein, Judicial Self-
Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 344-45 (1924). For a general discussion of the
political question doctrine, see Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). However, political question problems
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requested by the Solicitor General.35
The second type of error to which the Solicitor General may
confess is an error involving prosecutorial discretion. Such errors
occur when United States Attorneys prosecute in violation of the ex-
press38 Justice Department guidelines37 that are issued in the form
of memoranda from the Attorney General.38  In order to correct the
error in such oases, the Solicitor General enlists the aid of the Court
by requesting it to reverse or vacate and remand with leave for the
government to dismiss the charges.3 9
Faced with confessions of prosecutorial errors, the Court must
decide on two issues: whether to grant certiorari and, if it does
grant certiorari, whether to dispose of the case in compliance with the
Solicitor General's request. It is generally agreed that -the Court
should not review the validity or application of prosecutorial policies
in any context,4" both because the judiciary does not possess suffi-
are not likely to arise in the confession of error context. Typically, the errors
confessed are oversights of clearly established law. See, e.g., Martinez v. United
States, 380 U.S. 260 (1965) (failure to make finding as to constitutionality of a
search). Therefore, in the usual confession of error case, the propriety of judicial
determination is self-evident. If the Court discovers after the grant of certiorari that
the case does involve a political question, it can dismiss the case on the grounds that
certiorari was improvidently granted. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 6, §
5.15, at 227.
35. On occasion the Court will disagree with the Solicitor General's requested
disposition although it agrees that the decision below was clearly erroneous. See, e.g.,
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) (Court ordered a new trial rather than
remanding for additional findings as suggested by the Solicitor General). Clearly,
the Court's perception of the appropriate disposition should control.
36. This Note will consider only deviations from express Justice Department
prosecutorial policy as "prosecutorial errors." Although violations of unexpressed
policy are possible, they differ significantly from violations of express policy since
their correction would not serve the same interest in the promotion of consistency, see
text at note 53 infra, and would be more susceptible of misuse by the Solicitor
General, see text at note 80 infra. Therefore, the Court, when dealing with
deviations from unexpressed prosecutorial policy, should not follow the approach
recommended in this Note.
37. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975) (prosecution against
express policy of not prosecuting individuals acquitted of an offense in state court
arising from the same set of facts); Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966)
(prosecution against express policy limiting such prosecutions to aggravated of-
fenses).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 6, 1959, at 19, col. 2 (late city ed.) (Attorney
General Roger's memorandum forbidding on policy grounds federal prosecution
following state prosecution for substantially the same acts).
39. See, e.g., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
40. See, 'e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (court
refused to intervene when a United States Attorney accepted a guilty plea to reduced
charges from one codefendant and refused to allow the same arrangement for the
other codefendant); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965) (court recognized a strong interest in independently exercised
discretion as protected by the doctrine of separation of powers and thus refused to
review the exercise of prosecutorial discretion). The same factors that make judicial
review of prosecutorial discretion inappropriate in the lower courts apply when
questions of prosecutorial policy are presented to the Supreme Court.
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cient expertise to evaluate such executive policies41 and because judi-
cial review might transgress the constitutional separation of powers.42
This reasoning should prevail in cases where the Solicitor General
confesses prosecutorial error and requests that the Court dispose of
the case in a particular way. Once certiorari has been granted,
anything more than a surface check as -to the existence and consti-
tutionality of the prosecutorial guideline4 3 would lead the Court into
precisely the kind of judicial review that it rejects for policy and
constitutional reasons. It follows then that in a case involving con-
fession of prosecutorial error, disposition along the lines suggested
by the Solicitor General should be virtually automatic.
Recognition of the inappropriateness of independent judicial re-
view of the merits of prosecutorial policies does not dispose of the
other crucial issue in cases of confessed prosecutorial error: the
circumstances under which the Court should grant certiorari in the
first place. It does seem clear that if the Court exercises its discretion
pursuant to rule 19 in cases involving confessed prosecutorial errors
and reviews only selected cases, it is in effect examining Justice
Department policy.4" Thus, in order to differentiate among the
petitions for certiorari, the Court would have to scrutinize either the
nature of the policy violated or the severity of the breach of such
policy.
To avoid deviation from the established principle that prose-
cutorial policies must be insulated from judicial review at any stage,
the Court must choose between two alternatives: either always com-
ply or never comply with the joint certiorari request of the petitioner
and the Solicitor General. Adoption of a policy of always granting
certiorari and then, in deference to prosecutorial discretion, automati-
cally rectifying confessed deviations from express prosecutorial guide-
41. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967): "[Ques-
tions of review of prosecutorial discretion are to be] resolved on the basis of the
constitutional powers of the Executive. Few subjects are less adapted to judicial
review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and
whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or
whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought."
42. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("Article II,
Section 3 of the Constitution, provides that '[the President] shall take Care that the
Laws [shall] be faithfully executed.' The prerogative of enforcing the criminal law
was vested by the Constitution, therefore, not in the Courts, nor in private citizens,
but squarely in the executive arm of the government"). But cf. Note, Reviewability
of Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 130, 138
(1975).
43. See note 16 supra.
44. It is assumed that independent grounds sufficient for certiorari have not been
asserted. If such grounds are asserted, the Court may grant certiorari irrespective of
the Solicitor General's confession of error. However, even when an issue that
warrants intervention has been presented, the Court may wish to dispose of the case
on the basis suggested by the Solicitor General. See Note, supra note 3, at 1469.
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lines will promote three important societal interests. First, the Solici-
tor General, in his role as representative for the prosecution on
appeal, can act as a "buffer" between inflexible criminal stat-
utes45 and the public, by implementing prosecutorial policies that
are designed to protect society from legislative overcriminaliza-
tion.46  Strict enforcement of many criminal statutes results in
injustice and weakens public confidence in the legal system. By
allowing the government to withdraw its complaint against defend-
ants when Justice Department guidelines are violated, the Court will
minimize a practice that undermines the fundamental purposes of the
criminal justice system.
Second, the granting of certiorari in all cases involving confessed
prosecutorial errors will enable the Department of Justice to allocate
prudently its limited resources.48 Although virtually all prosecutorial
resources in a given case have already been expended by the time a
petition for certiorari is filed with the Court,49 substantial additional
government expenditures (e.g., on incarceration) will be required if
certiorari is not granted and the lower court conviction is not re-
versed.50 Decisions affecting the allocation of correctional and other
45. See, e.g., Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Jackson To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1941) (Attorney General Jackson's refusal
to prosecute two individuals for libelling Senator Tydings although there appeared to
be a violation of the letter of the law). See generally LaFave, The Prosecutor's
Discretion in The United States, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 532, 533 (1965).
46. This interest is usually promoted at the trial level. See LaFave, supra note
45, at 533-34; Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALn.
L.J. 1297, 1301-02 (1965). See also Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion
in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440-43 (1974). However, when this interest is
not promoted at the trial level due to a deviation from prosecutorial guidelines, only
correction of the deviation can prevent the inflexible application of the criminal laws.
Thus, in Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966), the Solicitor General
enlisted the aid of the Court to remedy the mistaken prosecution of a married couple
for sending obscene material to each other through the mail.
47. If prosecutors performed their responsibility "in strict accordance with rules
of law, precisely and narrowly laid down, the criminal law would be ordered but
intoldrable. Living would be a sterile compliance with soul-killing rules and taboos."
Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 427, 427 (1960).
48. See LaFave, supra note 45, at 533-34; Langbein, supra note 46, at 440-43. The
resources of any prosecutor are necessarily limited, and the Justice Department is no
exception. For example, the $2 billion requested for the Justice Department for fiscal
year 1975 was "the minimum necessary for the Department to carry out its responsi-
bilities to administer the law fairly and equitably." Departments of State, Justice,
and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1975, Hearings on H.R. 15404 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropri-
ations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 384-85 (1974) (testimony of Attorney General
Saxbe).
49. See Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50. For example, if the defendant is incarcerated, the cost to the government of
maintaining him in a federal penitentiary was estimated as of May 31, 1974, to be
$12 per day (or about $4,300 per year). Departments of State, Justice, and Com-
merce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975,
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post-conviction resources made at the appellate level 1 are no less
significant than those made at the trial level52 affecting the allocation
of prosecutorial resources between major and petty offenses.
Finally, automatically granting certiorari in cases in which express
Justice Department guidelines have been transgressed will encourage
uniform implementation of prosecutorial policies. Because the exer-
cise of unlimited discretion by prosecutors in initiating criminal pro-
ceedings gives rise to inconsistent and discriminatory law enforce-
ment, prosecutors have been encouraged to establish specific
guidelines to govern the commencement and conduct of criminal
prosecutions.5 3 In response to this concern over prosecutorial arbi-
trariness, the Attorney General has promulgated rules that delimit the
scope of United States Attorneys' discretion in certain classes of
cases.5 4 Although the Attorney General may be able prospectively to
enforce such prosecutorial rules by undertaking departmental discipli-
nary proceedings for deviation from Justice Department guidelines,55
the policies underlying these guidelines cannot be fully effectuated
unless the Court grants certiorari for confessed prosecutorial errors
and remands with leave for the government to dismiss the charges.56
Only if the Court complies with the Solicitor General's request can
future prosecutorial inconsistencies be eliminated, since compliance
Hearings on H.R. 15404 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 543 (1974).
51. See 1973 ArrY. GEN. ANN. REP. 192 ("Overcrowding, with its attendant
pressures, is one of the most serious problems faced by the Bureau of Prisons today").
Any government interest in allowing a prosecutor to apportion his resources
according to the probability of success, see Langbein, supra note 46, at 440-43, has no
relevance to the confession of error situation, since the prosecutor has already won in
the lower courts.
52. See M. ScHWARTz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14 (1961); LaFave, supra note 45, at
533-34; Note, supra note 46, at 1301.
53. See PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133-34 (1967) (recognizing
the interests in prosecutorial discretion but suggesting the establishment of definite
procedures to minimize potential abuse).
Some have gone so far as to recommend that prosecutors be required to promul-
gate rules, much as agencies do, and that adherence to these rules should be enforced
by the courts. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
54. See, e.g., Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966) (United States
attorneys shall not prosecute for sending private, obscene material through the mail
except in special circumstances); N.Y. Times, April 6, 1959, at 19, col. 2 (late
city ed.).
55. See Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032, 1036 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
56. The Government has occasionally attempted to win on remand despite the
Solicitor General's confession of error. See United States v. Crest Fin. Co., 302 F.2d
568 (7th Cir. 1962) (denial of motion for an order to reinstate a judgment that had
been vacated by the Court).
The Solicitor General should follow through on confessions of error and prohibit
a second prosecution in order to guarantee, as far as possible, that the deviation from
established policy is remedied.
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would buttress the deterrent effect of prospective enforcement, at least
in cases of willful deviations from departmental guidelines, by ensur-
ing that no effect is given to convictions resulting from such devia-
tions.5 7 Furthermore, such a practice would ensure that no individ-
ual will suffer the effects of inconsistent, arbitrary or discriminatory
imposition of legal process and sanctions, and would guarantee equal
treatment at the hands of the government.
Despite these significant interests that the Supreme Court would
promote by always granting certiorari in cases of confessed prosecuto-
rial error, various justices have expressed several concerns that might
discourage the Court from adopting such a policy. The remainder of
this Note will examine the bases for these concerns and will demon-
strate that they are not sufficiently serious to justify adopting the
alternative policy of never granting certiorari.
One objection to a policy of automatically granting certiorari is
that it might involve the Court in executive branch functions to a
degree inconsistent with accepted notions of separation of powers.
First of all, a policy of automatically granting certiorari might be
perceived as excessive judicial involvement in the internal affairs of
the Department of Justice. Chief Justice Burger, joined by two other
present members of the Court, recently argued in dissent from the
grant of certiorari in Watts v. United States 8 that "[t]he only pur-
pose served by the Court's action in such cases is to aid the Govern-
ment in emphasizing to its staff lawyers the need for a consistent in-
ternal administrative policy." 59 If the only effect of the Court's com-
pliance with the Solicitor General's request in cases of confessed
prosecutorial error was to facilitate the enforcement of departmental
administrative policies, the Chief Justice's concern might be war-
ranted.60  In fact, however, the grant of certiorari in such cases serves
an interest other than merely emphasizing to staff members the im-
portance of executive policies. It also provides a remedy for defend-
57. See Note, supra note 3, at 1471 ("Confessions of error demonstrate to the
Court and the staff of the Justice Department that deviations from policy will not be
permitted to succeed, and thus act as an internal control device").
The Court grants certiorari in order to advance important public interests rather
than the interests of the individual petitioner. See S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39 (1937). However, when the Solicitor General confesses prosecutorial
deviations from Justice Department guidelines, the interests of the petitioner should
be an additional factor in support of the Court's uniformly granting certiorari. The
rule against considering the interests of the petitioner rests in part on concern over
the Court's caseload. This concern carries little weight in regard to confessions of
error, which require only summary disposition. See Griswold, supra note 27, at 339-
40. The petitioner's position also suggests the equitable consideration that, if
prosecutorial guidelines had been followed, the case would never have been prose-
cuted.
58. 422 U.S. 1032 (1975).
59. 422 U.S. at 1035-36.
60. Cf. Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 172-74 (1954); United States v.
Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
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ants who have been charged and convicted as a consequence of pros-
ecutorial error. Therefore, the Court should not refuse to grant cer-
tiorari in confession of prosecutorial error cases solely because it con-
siders matters of departmental administration an insufficient basis for
judicial intervention.
Under a system of automatic granting of certiorari, a second basis
for concern over separation of powers is whether the policy of not
reviewing prosecutorial policies conflicts with the Court's perceived
"judicial obligation," as articulated in Young, 6 to examine independ-
ently all errors asserted as the basis for certiorari. Although the
Court has never explained how its "duty" to review should affect its
response to confessions of nonreviewable prosecutorial errors, Chief
Justice Burger discussed this issue in his Watts dissent.2 He con-
cluded that the Court's duty to review all confessed errors is unquali-
fied 63 and urged that, to be consistent both with this duty and with
the established practice of not reviewing prosecutorial policies,64 the
Court should not "blindly . . . accept the Government's belated
analysis"6 5 but rather should automatically deny certiorari in all cases
in which prosecutorial error is confessed.
Although the dissent in Watts appropriately recognizes the dis-
tinction between reviewable and nonreviewable errors, its conclusion
does not seem warranted. The Chief Justice appears to have relied
upon the tenet that federal courts, and the Supreme Court in particu-
lar, should not "automatically conform [their] judgments to results
allegedly dictated by a policy, however wise, which the judicial
branch had no part in formulating." 66
This tenet, however, is not inflexibly adhered to by the
judiciary. Both at the trial and Supreme Court levels, there are
instances in which the judiciary relies upon judgments of the execu-
tive branch as a basis for adjudication without reviewing the policy
involved. One example of such reliance at the trial level is in cases in
which the prosecutor, pursuant to rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, files for a voluntary dismissal of criminal
charges.6 7  Leave of court is required to effectuate -the dismissal, but
61. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1942).
62. See 422 U.S. 1032 (1975). The Chief Justice was joined in his dissent by
Justices White and Rehnquist.
In Watts, the Solicitor General confessed rthat the defendant was prosecuted
contrary to an established Justice Department policy prescribing the prosecution of an
individual following state prosecution for substantially the same act.
For another expression of the belief that errors asserted on petition must be
reviewed even though based on executive policy, see Petite v. United States, 361 U.S.
529, 533 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. See 422 U.S. at 1036-37.
64. See text at notes 40-42 supra.
65. 422 U.S. at 1036.
66. 422 U.S. at 1036.
67. FED. R. CiuM. P. 48(a) provides: "The Attorney General or the United States
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courts have construed their discretionary right to deny such leave so
narrowly that dismissal upon prosecutorial request is almost auto-
matic. 68 Thus, the courts aid the Justice Department in implement-
ing prosecutorial decisions without reviewing underlying prosecuto-
rial policy. Although this implementation of Justice Department pol-
icy is at the trial level, the issues confronting the district courts in
rule 48(a) cases are not unlike those faced by the Supreme Court
in cases of confessed prosecutorial error.6 9
Implementation of executive branch policies without review
by the Supreme Court is exemplified by the "act of state" doc-
trine.70  In applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court has re-
versed decisions in which the lower courts scrutinized the le-
gality of the acts of foreign sovereigns recognized by the executive
branch.71  Because the Court considers it important not to interfere
with the conduct of foreign policy, it restricts the scope of judicial
inquiry in cases involving such foreign sovereigns.72 The Supreme
Court has indicated that the doctrine is founded neither upon the text
of the Constitution nor upon principles of international law, but
rather upon constitutional considerations of separation of powers.73
attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or
complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not
be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant."
68. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975); 3 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRoCEDURE §§ 811-12 (1969).
69. For example, lower courts have based decisions not to review prosecutorial
discretion on separation of powers theory. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d
504, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1975).
There are, of course, procedural differences between dismissal at trial and dismis-
sal at the Supreme Court. First, the Supreme Court may deny certiorari and refuse
to hear the case at all; a trial court must either cooperate with the prosecutor and
dismiss, or disagree with him and proceed. Second, it may be easier for the Supreme
Court to proceed without the Solicitor General, see note 29 supra, than for the trial
court to proceed without the prosecuting U.S. Attorney, see 3 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 68, § 812, at 305.
Such practical problems do not undermine the validity of the analogy between
Supreme Court and trial court dismissals, however. In the first place, lower courts
have not based their decisions to comply with prosecutorial requests for dismissal on
such procedural grounds. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). In
the second place, trial courts have avoided practical problems by such means as
the appointment of a special prosecutor. See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 396
F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Tex. 1974), revd., 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975).
70. For a general discussion of the act of state doctrine, see Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
71. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
72. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). In fact,
members of the Court have even suggested that the executive branch can decide
whether the Court should apply the "act of state" doctrine. See First Natl. City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764 (1972).
73. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964). Spe-
cifically, Sabbatino held that the Court should refrain from analyzing the merits
of an "act of state" even if the act violates international law. The impact of this
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Despite the differing nature of the executive policies involved, the
problem that confronts the Court in act of state cases is analogous to
that presented in cases in which the Solicitor General confesses to
prosecutorial error. In both situations, the Court is constrained from
appraising executive policy because of the principles of separation of
powers and because the implementation of executive policy without
review promotes important values.
In light of these judicial practices, the reliance of the Watts
dissent upon the premise that the judiciary is obligated in all cases to
appraise independently executive policies before aiding in their imple-
mentation seems unwarranted. As the examples of rule 48(a) and
the act of state doctrine demonstrate, the adoption of a policy by the
Court that results in the implementation of executive policies without
review by the judiciary is not unprecedented.
Nor would such a policy be inconsistent with the Court's empha-,
sis in Young that judicial judgments "are precedents, and the proper
administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stip-
ulation of the parties. ' 4  This concern over precedent is warranted
when the Court decides matters of substantive law, as in cases of
confessed reviewable errors, since those decisions have precedential
effect for all future cases, even those in which error is not con-
fessed.7 5  However, by granting certiorari and rectifying all confes-
sions of prosecutorial error, the Court will not establish a precedent of
substantive law, but rather will frame a specific policy that the
judiciary should defer to the exercise of the Justice Department's
discretion where established prosecutorial policies have been trans-
gressed.7 6  It follows that once -the Supreme Court has been per-
suaded that the beneficial effects of rectifying prosecutorial error jus-
tify automatic granting of certiorari, it would undoubtedly want lower
holding was limited by the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). See First Natl. City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
74. Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942). Compare Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 58 (1968), with Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808, 808 (1952)
75. There is some dispute over the precedential effect of any per curiam disposi-
tion by the Court. See Note, supra note 28, at 721-22. Such dispositions have been
treated as less than binding precedent in light of the frequent difficulty in determining
what the Court decided. See id. at 722; Note, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme
Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. CI. L. REv. 279, 282-84 (1959). However, some courts
have given summary dispositions of the Supreme Court full precedential effect. See,
e.g., Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir. 1974); Case Note, 43
FoRDHAm L REv. 476 (1974). Thus, possible difficulties with the use of precedent
in the context of confessed prosecutorial error cannot be overlooked.
76. The Court may be concerned that ambiguities in its summary decisions could
lead lower courts to misinterpret and misapply its rulings, especially when the
petitioner has asserted other errors in seeking the Court's intervention. See, e.g.,
Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032 (1975) (Burger, C.L, dissenting) (violation of
constitutional protection against double jeopardy asserted along with prosecutorial
error). However, the Court can avoid this problem by specifying that its disposition
is based on the prosecutorial error alone.
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courts to rectify confessed prosecutorial errors at their level as well, in
order to minimize the burden on the Court and to conserve the
resources of defendants and the government.
A final objection to a policy of always granting certiorari in cases
of confessed prosecutorial error is the potential for manipulation by
the Solicitor General of confessions of error in cases in which no error
has in fact been committed. 77 If the Court were to defer automati-
cally to the Solicitor General's confession of prosecutorial error irre-
spective of a showing of deviation from an established and articu-
lated Justice Department policy, it would confer upon him an abso-
lute power to control the ultimate disposition of potentially all cases.
Although the Solicitor General presumably would only confess error
in order to rectify the injustice produced by an inadvertent prosecu-
tion,?8 automatic deference by the Court, without its even making
certain that official guidelines exist, may enable him to employ con-
fessions of error for other purposes.79 This concern, however, should
not affect the Court's choice between always and never granting
certikrari. Since this Note recommends that the Court should grant
certiorari and rectify the confessed error only in those cases in which
a deviation from an established and articulated Justice Department
policy is demonstrated,80 there is little danger that the Solicitor Gen-
eral could manipulate the Court through ad hoc determinations of
''error."'
In conclusion, the significant interests advanced by always grant-
ing certiorari greatly outweigh the countervailing considerations of
77. That the Solicitor General might confess error for reasons other than those
explicitly stated in the Justice Department's memorandum has caused the Court
concern in the past. See, e.g., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 532 (1960)
(Warren, C.J., concurring); Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808, 809 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. The Solicitor General usually is motivated by a sincere desire to avoid an in-
justice. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (Warren, C.J., concurring);
Sobeloff, supra note 3, at 149.
79. Cf. note 31 supra.
80. The standard proposed by this Note restricts the discretion of the Court to
grant certiorari and dispose summarily of confessions to prosecutorial error to a
greater degree than rule 48(a) restricts the discretion of trial courts to accept a
prosecutor's voluntary dismissal. The strictest interpretation of the "leave of court"
requirement of rule 48(a) requires only "a statement of reasons and underlying
factual basis [showing that] 'the reasons advanced for the proposed dismissal are
substantial.'" United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
quoting United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Assn., 228 F.
Supp. 483, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In contrast, this Note recommends that the Court
automatically cooperate with the Solicitor General only if deviation from express
Justice Department guidelines is established. Application of a fairly strict standard to
a dismissal of charges by the Supreme Court is supported by valid policy considera-
tions. Significant resources are committed to a prosecution and conviction before a
case reaches the Court. See Watts v. United States, 422 U.S. 1032, 1036 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, society has a strong interest that only impor-
tant considerations be allowed to upset a conviction at so late a stage in the criminal
process.
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the precedential effect of such dispositions and the potential for
misuse by the Solicitor General. While the appropriateness of judi-
cial implementation of Justice Department policies is a legitimate
concern, such a judicial role is not unprecedented. Therefore, the
Court should adopt a policy of always granting certiorari and comply-
ing with the Solicitor General's requested disposition whenever he
confesses to a deviation from established prosecutorial policy.
